Alban Billiette
Download CV ↓
← All work

Rustorigin

01 / 04

A custom anti-cheat for my own Rust servers, which run a build with no EasyAntiCheat. A client-side anti-cheat in the launcher catches injected code, memory readers, kernel drivers and overlays; the server catches recoil scripts and aimbots; and a review panel turns it all into bans. 318 bans in its last 30 days.

Year2026
ContextGame security, for my own network of modded Rust servers
RoleAnti-cheat design and engineering: client, server and review tooling
TagsAnti-cheat · Windows internals · C# · .NET · Win32 · Oxide · Harmony · Node.js
The Rustorigin admin panel, staff statistics for the last 30 days: 318 bans, 18 inspections and 10 mutes, with a chart of bans per day that peaks at 47 on 3 November

Goal

Rustorigin runs Rust as it played in April 2021, with the old recoil: a Main server with weekly wipes, and a Training server with free-for-all, scrims and arenas. That build doesn’t ship with EasyAntiCheat, so nothing stops a recoil script or an aimbot by default. Players only stay on a server they trust, so the anti-cheat had to be good, and it had to be fair: banning a legitimate player is as bad for a community server as missing a cheater.

The threat model

What players actually run against this build, and the layer that catches each one:

One system, three layers

The client-side anti-cheat

A server only sees what the game sends it. Most cheats live on the player’s PC: a program reading the game’s memory, code injected into it, a patched game file, or a script moving the mouse. So the launcher players use to install and start the game is also an anti-cheat client.

How it’s built. C# on .NET Framework with a WPF interface and no third-party code at all, in two processes:

What it checks, in the background while the game runs:

What happens with it. The launcher never bans or kicks on its own. Every check becomes a short label in a heartbeat signed with a per-session key, sent over a pinned TLS connection, and the server decides. New checks start in measure-only mode, and they only feed a case once they’ve proven reliable.

Tied to the real game. When a player joins, and regularly after that, the server checks for a live launcher session on that SteamID and IP, and kicks anyone who started the game another way. To prove the launcher sits next to that exact game, the server sends a one-time code to the game client, and the launcher has to read it back and sign it. The gate ran in shadow mode, logging only, before it was enforced, and it fails open: an outage on the server never kicks anyone.

No false alarms on normal PCs. A failed read means “no answer”, never a label. The signature rule was tested against the software players really run, from game launchers and chat apps to graphics drivers, mouse software, recording tools and antivirus, and 300 full scans with all of it running produced no labels.

Light on the game. A full scan takes 41 ms at the median and 72 ms at the 95th percentile. Beside the running game the launcher uses about 0.8% of the machine’s CPU and a flat 130 MB of memory, with no handle or thread leaks over 300 scans.

A launcher that’s hard to turn against players. Anything that runs with admin rights and updates itself is a target. Every download is checked against its SHA-256 before use, updates are only trusted with an offline RSA signature, and the installer is code-signed. Two security audits found no critical or high-severity issue. The medium ones were fixed, including a DLL-planting path closed by loading system libraries only from System32.

Catching recoil scripts

Recoil scripts are the most common cheat on old-recoil servers: they move the mouse for the player to cancel the spray pattern. The plugin compares the crosshair path of each controlled spray in three ways: against the player’s other sprays in the same session, against their earlier sessions, and against every other player through a shared spray index. The same script shows up as the same path, even when it moves to a new account. Paths are also matched against 32 recoil tables from published open-source scripts.

Not banning the wrong player

The first versions flagged real players, me included. Version 3.0 is a rework driven by 29 days of production logs: 94,000 sprays from 266 players.

Reviewing evidence in the panel

In production

Numbers from the live panel, in November 2026:

The ban log in the Rustorigin admin panel: 2 bans today, 86 in the last 7 days and 269 active, with bans from the injection check, the ban-evasion check and staff, for reasons such as banned by anticheat, banned by evasion and cheating. Player and staff names and Steam IDs are blurred.
The ban log in the panel. Player and staff names and Steam IDs are replaced and blurred.

Keeping players’ data private

The launcher asks for consent before the first game, and nothing is sent without it. Labels are fixed words, never memory contents, file paths or window titles. Game files are hashed on the PC and only “modified” leaves it, and program names are compared as hashes salted per session. Hardware IDs are hashed on the PC as well. On the server they’re hashed again with a secret key, keeps them in memory only, and logs counts, never values. IP geolocation was removed from the panel so no player address goes to a third party, and data is kept only as long as the privacy page says.

Making the game’s own checks accurate

Training runs several copies of an arena at the same coordinates. The game’s own checks for noclip, line of sight and building placement were hitting walls from the other copies, so honest players were caught out. A Harmony patch in C# hides the other copies from those checks, which keeps the built-in anti-cheat accurate instead of noisy.

How I built it

I designed the system and wrote it with Claude Code as my pair programmer: I set the rules, reviewed every change, tested it against real production logs and ran it live. The launcher has over 1,500 test cases and 31,000 fuzz cases, run in CI on Windows, plus a live harness where harmless stand-ins for cheats (a memory reader, a debugger, an overlay, an unsigned DLL) run against a fake game to check that each label really reaches the server. The session service has 89 tests and the panel around 410.

Result

318bans in the last 30 days, across both servers
97ban-evasion accounts caught on the same PC as a banned player
629anti-cheat cases closed as false alarms, with nobody banned
2,000+automated tests across the launcher, the session service and the panel
Visit Rustorigin
Next project → AssaultCubeDMA